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Abstract
COVID-19 has given rise to a lot of malicious content online, including hate speech, 
online abuse, and misinformation. British MPs have also received abuse and hate 
on social media during this time. To understand and contextualise the level of abuse 
MPs receive, we consider how ministers use social media to communicate about the 
pandemic, and the citizen engagement that this generates. The focus of the paper 
is on a large-scale, mixed-methods study of abusive and antagonistic responses to 
UK politicians on Twitter, during the pandemic from early February to late May 
2020. We find that pressing subjects such as financial concerns attract high levels 
of engagement, but not necessarily abusive dialogue. Rather, criticising authorities 
appears to attract higher levels of abuse during this period of the pandemic. In addi-
tion, communicating about subjects like racism and inequality may result in accusa-
tions of virtue signalling or pandering by some users. This work contributes to the 
wider understanding of abusive language online, in particular that which is directed 
at public officials.
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Introduction
Social media can offer a “temperature check” on which topics and issues are trend-
ing for certain cross-sections of the public, and how they feel about them [21]. This 
temperature has run high during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a number of incen-
diary and misleading claims [16], as well as hateful and abusive content [68] appear-
ing online. This content can interfere with both government and public responses to 
the pandemic.
A recent survey of coronavirus conspiracy beliefs in England, for example, dem-
onstrated that belief in conspiracy was associated with lower compliance with gov-
ernment guidelines. Moreover, the authors found that 1 in 5 of their participants had 
a strong endorsement of conspiracy thinking [25], indicating that this is not just a 
fringe issue. Online verbal abuse contributes as well, being both cause and conse-
quence of misinformation: the quality of information and debate is damaged as cer-
tain voices are silenced/driven out of the space,1 and escalation leads to angry and 
aggressive expressions [60]. Understanding the interplay between malicious online 
content and the public’s relationships with authorities during a health crisis is neces-
sary for an effective response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Scope
This work charts Twitter abuse in replies to UK MPs from before the start of the 
pandemic in the UK, in early February, until late May 2020, to plot the health of 
relationships of UK citizens with their elected representatives through the unprec-
edented challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic up to this point. We consider reac-
tions to different individuals and members of different political parties, and how 
they interact with events relating to the virus. We review the dominant hashtags on 
Twitter as the country moves through different phases, as well as some dominant 
conspiracy theories. For these data, we show trends in abuse levels, for MPs overall 
as well as for particular individuals and for parties. We also compare prevalence of 
conspiracy theories, and contextualise them against other popular topics/concerns 
on Twitter.
In addition to our quantitative analysis, we present an in-depth qualitative analy-
sis on tweets that had both a high amount and high percentage of abusive responses 
in our data. We use a set of qualitative codes derived from the literature on how 
authorities make use of social media during crisis (and health crisis in particular). 
Referring to this as the social media activities of the MP who authored a tweet, 
we label each tweet according to its potential agenda (e.g., reaching out to con-
stituents, communicating official information). This allows us to see the distribu-
tion of media activities across different parties and genders, for example. We then 
developed inductive codes for the COVID-19 topic (e.g., policy, communication 
and leadership) and potential controversial subject of the tweet (e.g., that the tweet 
1 https ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/elect ion-2019-50246 969.
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makes criticisms of COVID-related policy, or discusses a touchy subject like Brexit 
or Inequality). We also noted any attached URLs or images for reference and listed 
the abusive words found in each reply to the tweet. Finally, we prepared an analysis 
of those labels by gender, party, sexual orientation, and ethnicity. In our analysis, we 
consider how social dimensions of antagonistic political discourse in the UK (ide-
ology, political authority, and affect), which have been visible in other recent key 
moments (such as Brexit and successive general elections), influence the civility of 
discourse during COVID-19.
Contribution
This study aims to answer the following research questions: 
1. How has the context of COVID-19 impacted the typical patterns that have been 
observed in previous work about hateful and abusive language toward UK MPs?
2. How do the social dimensions that have impacted political discourse on Brexit 
and successive general elections appear to impact how social media activities are 
perceived during the COVID-19 pandemic?
3. Which social media activities of UK MPs during the COVID-19 pandemic receive 
the most abusive replies? How can we contextualise these results?
The contribution of this study is to understand both the content and context of abu-
sive and hateful communication, particularly toward governments and authorities 
during a health crisis. Our focus, UK MPs, adds to a growing longitudinal body of 
work that analyses online abuse at many key moments in British politics from 2015 
to the present [6, 28, 34, 75].
In the following sections, we begin with a description of the current context and 
a brief summary of related work. We then outline our methodology in detail before 
progressing onto findings. Finally, we summarise and conclude our manuscript with 
some suggestions for future work.
Context of COVID‑19
The dangers and perceived risks of COVID-19 have fluctuated during the pandemic 
as a result of emerging knowledge. This feature of the pandemic creates an environ-
ment of uncertainty and ambivalence that feeds malicious content on social media.
Early epidemiological studies of COVID-19 [44, 77] implicated certain risk fac-
tors, such as age, gender, and pre-existing conditions, which may impact transmis-
sion and severity of illness. As the pandemic progressed, researchers began to under-
stand more about asymptomatic transmission [3, 18, 52], discovering that there may 
be many more cases of COVID-19 than once realised. This led some researchers to 
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suggest that the morbidity rate of COVID-19 is lower than initially presumed [23], 
though these data are difficult to calculate.2
Over time, some communities were discovered to be at a greater vulnerability. 
Research on health care professionals who contracted COVID-19, for example, 
indicated that the most seriously ill individuals had multiple exposures to the virus, 
primarily at work [12], as well as longer duration of (sometimes unprotected) expo-
sure to the virus [37]. As more information emerged about disproportionate cases of 
COVID-19 and poor health outcomes in Black and Asian communities in England, 
researchers began to also investigate early warning signs that some social or ethnic 
communities were more vulnerable than others [41, 53]. This too has led to chal-
lenging debates about social welfare, racism, and healthcare during the pandemic. 
Knowledge about the virus and its transmission continues to evolve.
Tensions between competing political and social interests during times of uncer-
tainly can lead to an increase in antagonistic discourse, in particular, if the public do 
not feel that threats can be managed [65]. This leaves the door open for antagonis-
tic groups to spread hate and malicious content even into mainstream communities 
[68].
Related work
Organisations use social media during crisis events to correct rumours, prevent cri-
sis escalation, provide facts or information, transmit proactiveness toward resolving 
the situation, and to communicate directly with members of the public (without tem-
poral or geographic constraints) [20]. Not using social media to address a crisis can 
incur reputational damage for the organisation [17].3
Twitter and other forms of social media are popular tools used by organisations 
and governments to communicate with citizens during crisis events [55]. The focus 
for the literature below is to briefly review how governments and authorities use 
such tools to communicate about health crises, particularly in the UK, and to explore 
how malicious content and abuse has been examined previously within this context.
Public use of social media in a health crisis
Before we address how politicians use social media in a health crisis, it is worth 
examining perspectives of the public and what they expect from politicians when 
emergencies like COVID-19 arise. Evidence indicates that the public expect a swift, 
transparent response from the government to crisis [7, 55]. The public may also 
wish to engage with the government on its response. The greater the political inter-
est of the user, the more likely they are to perceive and take advantage of the “con-
nective affordances” that social media provides for politicians and their constituents 
3 https ://www.pewre searc h.org/inter net/fact-sheet /socia l-media /.
2 https ://ourwo rldin data.org/morta lity-risk-covid .
405
1 3
Journal of Computational Social Science (2020) 3:401–443 
to engage [40]. Third, and perhaps most importantly, during a health crisis, most 
citizens will be interested in government advice and support [46, 67]. For example, 
Vos and Buckner examined Tweets that were shared during H7N9 “Bird Flu” health 
crisis, and found that the majority of messages were about “collective sense-making 
responses” under conditions of uncertainty, rather than “efficacy responses” offer-
ing specific advice or information that would help the public to respond appropri-
ately [70]. A similar pattern was observed in response to the 2016 Zika virus out-
break, with individuals using social media to form a personal risk assessment [35]. 
Llewellyn et  al. [46] found that the public seeks advice from experts and that the 
informal character of online communication can interfere with the public’s ability to 
form good opinions about the expertise of individuals online, even public figures. If 
sense-making and risk-assessment are the top public tasks for which they seek infor-
mation on social media, government messages that do not respond to this need may 
miss the mark.
Politicians’ social media use in a health crisis
In their analysis of political communication on social media, Stieglitz and Dang-
Xuan [63] show that politicians may use social media for communication and per-
suasion, to “meet” voters and engage them in discussion, and also to communicate 
policy or other important information to their constituents. Political analysis of US 
congress members on Twitter shows that self-promotion is also an activity in which 
politicians engage, using the opportunity to share personal information or stories, 
and present themselves and their platforms in a good light [27]. However, this is not 
always true. Studies from the Swedish electoral context showed that Swedish politi-
cians did not use Twitter to engage with voters, but rather to provide information to 
them [43]. In the UK, because internal party campaigns are based on individual can-
didates, politicians in the UK share some media behaviours with their counterparts 
in the US, where individual voter appeal is critical to campaign success [45].
Dimensions of political discourse in the UK
The COVID-19 pandemic is a novel political situation in which ministers must 
respond to the crisis, while continuing to function in their roles. Though the situ-
ation may be new, the dialogue around COVID-19 is influenced by existing social 
and political dimensions of British political discourse.
In their work documenting positions around the European Referendum, 
Andreouli et  al. named three dimensions for understanding the emergent dialogue 
around Brexit [1], that we feel may be useful here. These are “political values, politi-
cal authority, and the authority of affect”.
With regard to values, the authors reflect on how existing ideological themes 
impact how an issue is perceived and discussed, in particular, where classical 
dichotomies do not hold up. For example, while the left typically associates itself 
with anti-prejudice and tolerance, associating such qualities with voting to “remain” 
is inconsistent with other leftist ideas to be anti-establishment. The authors argue 
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that this tension creates a “liminal hotspot” where cosmopolitanism and critiques of 
globalisation intersect.
We propose this same step, in light of the current crisis, to understand the 
dominant political and social themes that influence abuse toward UK MPS during 
COVID-19. We are already seeing evidence of potential areas of tension in the cur-
rent pandemic, such as the needs of older4 and younger5 people, the reliance on sci-
ence and perception of risk [11, 25], the division between the wealthy and the poor 
[72], and the experiences of the urban and rural [39, 49].
Second, Andreouli et al. [1] discuss the notion of political authority, and how the 
sovereignty of the UK within the EU becomes a backdrop for discourse on immigra-
tion during the European Referendum. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the sover-
eignty of local governments within the UK has been a consistent feature of debate, 
whether it involved avoiding beauty spots in Wales during lockdown,6 comparing 
Scotland’s success in handling the virus,7 or the differential impact on the economy 
in Northern Ireland.8 Media reports during the peak of the outbreak also indicated 
resistance toward lockdown,9,10. and wearing face-coverings.11,12 As we move 
toward the next phases of the crisis, conflicts about personal agency and choice are 
likely to play out at both individual and group levels in how the public respond to 
government guidance.
Finally, Andreouli et al. [1] discuss the role of affect in political discourse. They 
demonstrate how impassioned speech has become its own kind of credibility, in 
which the narrative, rather than being factual, is important. In September 2019, par-
ties signed a pledge to use moderate language after a series of heated and antagonis-
tic debates. This discussion highlights how ideology, values, and cultural awareness 
influence language perception.13
6 https ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales -52614 204.
7 https ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotl and-53195 166.
8 https ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-north ern-irela nd-53386 976.
9 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/uk-news/2020/may/14/polic e-vow-to-break -up-plann ed-anti-lockd own-
prote sts-in-uk-citie s
10 https ://www.teleg raph.co.uk/news/2020/04/20/coron aviru s-world -erupt s-prote st-again st-lockd own-
pictu res/
11 https ://www.washi ngton post.com/world /europ e/face-masks -coron aviru s-uk/2020/07/14/d05df b7c-
c5d4-11ea-a825-87220 04e41 50_story .html.
12 https ://www.teleg raph.co.uk/news/2020/04/06/brita ins-hubri stic-scien tific -advis ers-wrong -publi 
c-shoul d-weari ng/.
13 https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/polit ics/2019/sep/30/westm inste r-parti es-sign-pledg e-to-use-moder ate-
langu age.
 https ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-polit ics-49833 804.
 https ://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-37978 582.
4 https ://www.gov.uk/gover nment /publi catio ns/coron aviru s-COVID -19-suppo rt-for-care-homes /coron 
aviru s-COVID -19-care-home-suppo rt-packa ge.
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One of the goals of this research is to analyse topics of discussion and responses 
within these three dimensions (see “Dimensions of political discourse during 
COVID-19 (RQ2)”). This will allow us to contextualise the public’s antagonistic 
responses to UK MPs on Twitter during COVID-19 thus far.
Hate and abuse of British MPs online
In the UK, where legal frameworks tend to evolve, hate speech was defined through 
several legal statutes, including the Public Order Act of 1986, clarifying the groups 
in need of protection.14 However, more generally, hate speech is communication to 
marginalised groups or communities (and their sympathisers) that they are not wel-
come or wanted [71]. Crucially, hate speech is associated with power [54].
Governments and politicians have communicated hateful messages, for example, 
through language about Romani people in Europe [59] or Mexican and other Latin 
immigrants in the United States [14, 42], all of which experience discrimination 
in their host countries. Governments have contributed to hate through politicising 
tribal identity in sub-Saharan countries like Kenya and Rwanda [24, 61], and how 
they shape debates about free speech [56] or migration [66] more generally. Politi-
cians, therefore, can both be the targets of hate (as members of protected groups) 
and the perpetrators (as public authorities whose words matter). Governments can 
also antagonise the public. In the context of COVID-19, the ways in which politi-
cians are communicating about potentially volatile issues, such as re-opening the 
economy or avoiding social protest, add to the overall “health” of the discourse, or 
diminish it.
There is a considerable amount of historical data on the prevalence of online 
abuse directed at British MPs, particularly on Twitter. Previous work [6, 28, 34, 75] 
has shown rising levels of hostility towards UK politicians on Twitter, particularly 
in the context of divisive issues, such as Brexit or inequality. Partisan operators have 
been implicated in fanning the flames with malicious content, such as misinforma-
tion or troll accounts [31].
In their 2017 and 2020 papers, Ward and McLoughlin examined online abuse 
received by British MPs from November 14, 2016 to January 28, 2017 [51, 74]. 
The major findings from this work were that the amount of online hate (rather than 
language that can be described as “abusive” or uncivil) is relatively low and, as 
such, men receive more online abuse than women. The authors also showed that 
increased name recognition and popularity have a positive relationship with levels 
of abuse. Crucially, however, the authors note that women and those from a minor-
ity background are more likely to receive abusive replies that can be classified as 
hate speech. Abuse toward specific parties was difficult to distinguish, as levels of 
abuse may be influenced by one party member who attracts a significant proportion 
of abuse. When controlling for this, the authors found that less visible MPs had a 
very small percentage of hate and abuse. This means that women MPs with vis-
ibility disproportionately attract hate speech, as do men with visibility other forms 
14 http://www.legis latio n.gov.uk/ukpga /1986/64/conte nts.
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of abusive language. This work prompted questions about what visibility means for 
people of different genders and backgrounds. Southern and Harmer [62] conducted 
a deeper content analysis on tweets received by MPs during a period, and found 
that while men received more incivility in terms of numbers of replies, women were 
more likely to receive an uncivil reply. Women were more likely to be stereotyped 
by identity (men by party) and to be questioned in their position as an MP.
Gorrell et al. [30] extended this work to define four visibility factors that appear 
to influence the amount of abuse the UK MPs receive online:
• Prominence: Individuals in the public eye will receive more abuse;
• Event surges: Events leads to spikes in abuse (such as participation in an event or 
political activities);
• Engagement: Expressing strong opinions on social media can result in more per-
sonal abuse;
• Identity: Gender, ethnicity, and other personal factors impact which opinions one 
is allowed to hold and express without receiving abuse.
Gorrell et al. also note that the impacts or consequences of abusive language are not 
manifesting in the same ways for male and female MPs, or MPs with intersectional 
identities of race and gender. Where some abuse is distressing, other abuse is per-
sonal and threatening, and limits women’s participation in the public office [19, 28, 
57].
From this review, a picture emerges of the precipitating activities, mediating fac-
tors and dimensions of online abuse toward UK MPs during COVID-19, which can 
be interrogated through our large-scale study.
Methodology
In this work, we apply a combination of computational and social science methods 
to evaluate abuse toward UK MPs on Twitter. We utilise a large tweet collection on 
which natural language processing analysis has been performed to identify abusive 
language. This methodology is presented in detail by Gorrell et al. [28] and summa-
rised here. We then follow Braun and Clarke’s [10] process of thematic analysis on 
a subset of tweets that received 8% or more of abusive replies, in which at least 20 
abusive replies were received. This analysis is described in more detail below.
Corpus
The corpus was created by collecting tweets in real time using Twitter’s streaming 
API. We used the API to follow the accounts of UK MPs—this means that we col-
lected all the tweets sent by each current MP, any replies to those tweets, and any 
retweets either made by the MP or of the MP’s own tweets. Note that this approach 
does not collect all tweets which an individual would see in their timeline, as it does 
not include those in which they are just mentioned. However, “direct replies” are 
409
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included. We took this approach as the analysis results are more reliable due to the 
fact that replies are directed at the politician who authored the tweet, and thus, any 
abusive language is more likely to be directed at them. Data were of a low enough 
volume not to be constrained by Twitter rate limits.
The study spans February 7th until May 25th 2020 inclusive, and discusses Twit-
ter replies to currently serving MPs that have active Twitter accounts (574 MPs in 
total). Table 1 gives the overall statistics for the corpus.
Rule‑based identification of abusive language
A rule-based approach was used to detect abusive language, as in previous work 
[30]. An extensive vocabulary list of slurs (e.g., “idiot”), offensive words such as the 
“f” word and potentially sensitive identity markers, such as “lesbian” or “Muslim”, 
forms the basis of the approach. The slur list contained 1081 abusive terms or short 
phrases in British and American English, comprising mostly an extensive collec-
tion of insults, racist, and homophobic slurs, as well as terms that denigrate a per-
son’s appearance or intelligence, gathered from sources that include http://hateb ase.
org and Farrell et al. [22]. 131 offensive words were used, along with 451 sensitive 
words. “Bleeped” versions such as “f**k” are also included.
On top of these word lists, 53 rules are layered, specifying how they may be com-
bined to form an abusive utterance as described above, and including further speci-
fications such as how to mark quoted abuse, how to type abuse as sexist or racist, 
including more complex cases such as “stupid Jew hater”, and what phrases to veto, 
for example “polish a turd” and “witch hunt”. Making the approach more precise as 
to target (whether the abuse is aimed at the politician being replied to or some third 
party) was achieved by rules based on pronoun co-occurrence. Where people make 
a lot of derogatory comments about a third party in their replies to a politician; how-
ever, for example racist remarks about others, there may be targeting errors leading 
to false positives.
Data from Kaggle’s 2012 challenge, “Detecting Insults in Social Commentary” 
[5], were used to evaluate the success of the approach, this being in keeping with 
our definition of abuse (many more recent corpora define this differently, e.g., “tox-
icity”, as in the Jigsaw corpus [9], is much broader). Our approach was shown to 
have an accuracy of 80%, and a precision/recall/F1 of 0.72/0.47/0.57. This preci-
sion is considered sufficient for empirical work (being greater than 0.7 [58]). How-
ever, there is a long tail of linguistically more complex abuse that is hard to identify 
with sufficient precision, and therefore, recall is low. Being a hard problem, this is 
not dissimilar to the state of the art on cross-domain data [76], but the main rea-
son for this choice of approach lies in the critical importance of unbiased classifica-
tion for this type of work—naively applied machine learning approaches result more 
false positives for, e.g., ethnic minorities or women [8, 13, 36]. Future work will 
explore promising but quite preliminary work in fair abuse classification [26, 38]. 
The resulting system is publicly available at https ://cloud .gate.ac.uk/shopf ront/displ 
ayIte m/gate-hate.
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The method for detecting COVID-19-related tweets is based on a list of related 
terms. This means that tweets that are implicitly about the epidemic but use no 
explicit COVID terms, for example, “@BorisJohnson you need to act now,” are not 
flagged.
Thematic analysis
To understand more about the kinds of tweets attracting high levels of abuse, we 
considered several approaches for ranking them. Ranking tweets by the most replies 
will surface prominent individuals, but perhaps not always polarising individuals or 
viewpoints. We decided on an initial criterion that a tweet had to have received 8% 
or more abusive replies, which is nearly twice the average level of abuse noted by 
[29, 34, 75]. In addition, to filter out tweets that were attracting just a handful of 
abusive replies, we examined tweets that received at least 20 abusive replies. We had 
191 tweets in this sample.
All tweets were first examined and coded openly, as suggested by Braun and 
Clarke [10], to see which patterns emerge. Contentious subjects (such as Brexit, rac-
ism, and even Jeremy Corbyn), as well as potential media agendas (such as reaching 
out to under-valued communities, or making criticisms of the party in government) 
emerged from this analysis. We then compared open codes to themes from the litera-
ture regarding social media activities that politicians may undertake during a health 
crisis, as well as ideological themes and existing priors that may be influencing how 
UK MPs are perceived. We created a final set of categories through the processes 
of reduction and comparison across the codes. We then re-coded the data according 
to the final annotation scheme in Table 2. While the sample is small, which reduces 
potential for generalisation, this qualitative analysis is meant to highlight new and 
nuanced relationships between what is being said and how the public is responding.
In addition to these codes, we also examined the topics MPs referred to in their 
posts and grouped them inductively into categories of topics that are considered 
controversial in UK politics. These were: home rule/nationalism with respect to 
Northern Ireland, Scotland or Wales; inequality; and Brexit, alongside specific indi-
viduals and the ways in which they communicate. Of course, the topic of COVID-19 
itself—the government response and the impacts—was a primary topic category, as 
well. Following the distribution of these codes and topics in our sample, we used 
descriptive statistics and further qualitative analysis to expand on trends and obser-
vations uncovered through our computational approaches.
Table 1  Corpus statistics
Figures give number of original tweets authored by MPs, number of 
retweets authored by them, number of replies written by them, num-
ber of replies received by them, number of abusive replies received 
by them, and abusive replies received as a percentage of all replies 
received
Original Retweet Reply ReplyTo Abusive % Abuse
































Table 2  Media categories that express MPs’ activities on Twitter, to which the MP received abusive replies
Media category No. tweets Description Examples
Defending 14 MPs responding to critiques of oneself or others Replying to Keir Starmer: A low blow and misjudged at this 
time. Yes we need everyone to have PPE but the right use of 
It is also needed.- Stuart Anderson
Defending (e) 3 Similar to the above, but with “escalation indicators” 
(described below)
For God’s sake. The man nearly died. He is going to Cheq-
uers away from the glare of publicity to recuperate and 
be with his partner who is due to give birth in a matter of 
weeks. Get a life - idiot keyboard warrior! #HardHearted - 
Andrea Jenkyns
Direct Rebuke 3 MPs critiquing someone who is not directly an authority No celebrations today. Only relief that the disastrous Corbyn 
era is over and hope that we can turn the page on what 
it did to Labour. Congratulations to (Kier Starmer) and 
(Angela Rayner) on their elections as Leader and Deputy 
Leader. - Pat McFadden
Direct Rebuke (e) 3 Similar to the above, but with escalation indicators Not that I should be surprised by the lazy left but interesting 
how work-shy socialist and nationalist MPs tried to keep 
the remote Parliament going beyond 2 June. - Henry Smith
Direct Rebuke of Authorities 60 MPs critiquing people in power, in particular coming from 
opposition parties
It is irresponsible and short-sighted from the government to 
rule out extending the post-Brexit transition period. We 
should be taking action now to provide certainty for busi-
ness in the face of this global economic challenge. - Lisa 
Nandy
Direct Rebuke of Authorities (e) 70 Similar to the above, but with escalation indicators Boris Johnson boasting about shaking hands with coronavi-
rus patients. You could not make it up. Britain is about to 
learn the hard way this is not the man to lead us in a crisis. 
- David Lammy
Engage Voters 47 MPs reaching out to potential new voters and speaking to 
core voters
If there’s one clip to watch from #Brits2020 last night, it’s 
this. (Santan Dave) speaking truth to power. Hero - Zarah 
Sultana

































Descriptions and examples included
Table 2  (continued)
Media category No. tweets Description Examples
Events 12 The MP’s tweet relates back to an event that preceded the 
Tweet or a clear pattern of behaviour
NEWS: My Telegraph article on the next stage of our #coro-
navirus plan: We must all do everything in our power to 
protect lives. - Matt Hancock
Information 4 MPs providing information without commentary Data sources and maps here: - Richard Burgon
Proactive 24 MPs relating a sense of doing something about the problem Dear @patel4witham please do the right thing and release 
the women in Yarlswood now. - Jess Phillips
Unclear 4 Tweet could not be annotated or belongs to no clear cat-
egory
Quite the change in rhetoric from the days when Welsh Gov-
ernment were encouraging people to come to Wales and 
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In consideration of rigour, we have taken several steps to adjust for having used 
one annotator for the qualitative analysis. Barbour has suggested focusing on alter-
native explanations in analysis, rather than a potentially superficial measure of inter-
rater agreement through multiple coders [4]. In addition, we provide a full justifica-
tion of the coding scheme against each tweet in the sample, available at the URL 
noted in “Availability of data and material”, so that other researchers can interrogate 
and interpret our findings accordingly.
In the following section, we present our findings, which are organised by research 
question and which include both the quantitative and qualitative data analysis that 
answer that particular research question.
For RQ1, we rely primarily on our literature review of trends and high-level 
analysis of abuse toward British MPs. We compare this with our findings from the 
COVID-19 period which we studied. For RQ2, we consider how our findings fit the 
dimensions noted by Andreouli et al. [1] as impacting contemporary British political 
discourse: ideology, authority, and affect. We explore the four factors that contribute 
to how these dimensions are perceived, such as prominence, specific events, engage-
ment habits, and features of identity [30]. Finally, for RQ3, we present our qualita-
tive analysis on the social media activities of UK MPs during COVID-19 thus far. 
We contextualise the abusive responses which they receive for these activities, given 
the dimensions and contributing factors that may play a role.
Findings: general trends and comparisons (RQ1)
Our first research question asked: How has the context of COVID-19 impacted the 
typical patterns that have been observed in previous work about hateful and abusive 
language toward UK MPs? To answer this question, we begin with a review of the 
time period studied, namely February 7th until May 25th 2020 inclusive, placing it 
in historical context.
Gorrell et al. [33] use the same (cautious) abuse counting methodology as we use 
here to show that aside from a blip around the 2015 general election, abuse toward 
MPs on Twitter has been tending to rise from a minimum of 2% of replies in 2015, 
peaking mid-2019 at over 5% with a smaller peak of around 4.5% around the 2019 
general election. After the election, however, abuse toward MPs fell to around 3.5%.
In the timeline in Fig. 1, we zoom in on the study period, and show abuse lev-
els overall, toward all MPs, on a per-week basis since mid-February. This timeline 
shows a rise in abuse, back up to over 4% around the time of the introduction of 
social distancing, before dipping, and then gradually beginning to rise again later 
in the study period. We see that the macro-average abuse level (red line, averaged 
across MPs rather than across pooled counts, [48] p. 577) remains relatively steady, 
suggesting that this fluctuation is confined to a small number of high profile politi-
cians (therefore being more evident in the micro-averaged blue line).
Figure 2 shows abuse received as a percentage of all replies received by MPs, for 
six distinct time periods discussed in more detail below. We see that, on the whole, 
response to the conservative party has been favourable. The exception is after May 
10th, when the negative response to Dominic Cummings’ decision to travel north 
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with COVID-19 symptoms came to the fore. Responses to Liberal Democrat MPs 
are more erratic due to their lower number. In previous studies, we have found con-
servatives receiving higher abuse levels, yet here we see Labour politicians receiving 
more abuse in most periods. This was in evidence even in February, so precedes the 
pandemic, although Twitter has tended to be left-leaning in the UK [32]. It remains 
to be seen if this is the beginning of a swing to the right or if it is specific to the 
times, e.g., arising from a desire to trust authority during times of crisis [69]. It may 
even be related to the presence of polarising characters, for example Mr. Corbyn, in 
comparison with new Labour leader Keir Starmer.
There is a significant negative correlation between receiving a high level of 
COVID-related attention and receiving abuse ( −0.52, p < 0.001 , Feb 7th to May 
25th, Spearman’s PMCC). We see this clearly in prominent government figures 
below, who are receiving the lion’s share of the COVID-19 attention and lower lev-
els of abuse than seen for them in pre-COVID periods [30, 34]. However, the cor-
relation is significant across the sample of all MPs. The reaction of the public to the 
Conservative party and the government’s actions during COVID-19 may be related 
to the conditions of a public health crisis as discussed in [46, 67], in which citizens 
may feel more motivated to trust authorities, although it may also follow from the 
crisis engaging a different group of people than usually respond to politicians on 
Twitter. Future work will have to examine the strength of this finding.
With a view to separating out different groups of Twitter users, we tracked 
hashtags relating to dominant pro- vs anti-lockdown perspectives, as well as issues 
of concern; namely conspiracies and misinformation, and racism in conjunction 
with the pandemic. Pro- and anti-lockdown hashtags were easily acquired, being 
dominant hashtags appearing in the dataset. They were then extended with minor 
linguistic variants. This report15 from Moonshot CVE was used as a guide to the 
overall conspiracy landscape within COVID-19. They provide some hashtags, and 
variants were then acquired, again, from looking down the list of hashtags appearing 
in the dataset for other variants, and including linguistic variations. The areas which 
they highlight are anti-Chinese feeling/conspiracy theory, theories that link the virus 
to a Jewish plot, theories that link the virus to an American plot, and generic “deep 
state” and 5g-based theories and general theories that the virus is a plot or hoax. 
Table 3 shows substantial evidence of ill-feeling toward China.
In our analysis, MPs using Chinese data or referencing the Chinese government’s 
response to COVID-19 in a positive context appear to attract abuse. One example, 
in terms of receiving a high percentage of abuse as well as a notable degree of atten-
tion, was the one below from Richard Burgon.
https ://twitt er.com/Richa rdBur gon/statu s/12440 43022 29737 0626 (17% abuse or 
6% of all abuse sent to MPs in March post-lockdown):
This is a Trump-style attempt to divert blame from the UK government’s fail-
ures.
15 http://moons hotcv e.com/COVID -19-consp iracy -theor ies-hate-speec h-twitt er/.
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A World Health Organization report says China “rolled out perhaps the most 
ambitious, agile & aggressive disease containment effort in history”
We haven’t even sorted out enough tests for NHS staff
China’s record of human rights or transparency is often provided as evidence of 
argument against such tweets. However, mixed in with this are also a number of Sin-
ophobic comments about China having “caused” or “started” the virus, for which, at 
present, there is no reliable scientific evidence. It is not clear how potentially useful 
critiques of the Chinese government may be discussed without also provoking more 
sinister, racist commentary.
Classic conspiracy theories are in evidence, but numbers of mentions are low 
(though note that most of the 183 mentions of “NWO” (“new world order”) are 
now COVID-19-related, suggesting opportunistic incorporation of COVID-19 
into existing mythologies). There is considerable evidence of some Twitter users 
not believing in the virus, and numbers of mentions to this effect are within one 
Fig. 1  Abuse percentage received by all MPs, macro- (red) and micro- (blue) average, per week
Fig. 2  Abusive replies as a percentage of all replies received, micro-average, split by party, and time 
period
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order of magnitude of the popular “stay home save lives”. Yet, all are surpassed 
by the theme of economic support for those not in established employment 
(“#newstarterfurlough”).
So across the board, COVID-19 has not led to higher proportions of abuse on Twit-
ter for MPs compared with the high levels of abuse directed at them in 2019. How-
ever, these findings might be partially explained by varying degrees of engagement by 
different societal groups, in addition to events affecting attitudes to authority. As we 
will see in “Political authority”, the comparatively positive response to Boris Johnson 
might be explained by more people replying to him than would normally do so; this 
extra attention was not abusive. The lower levels of abuse received by MPs who receive 
more tweets mentioning COVID-19 might also be explained by different people reply-
ing to politicians than usually would. A particularly striking illustration of this comes 
from tweets to MPs using the hashtag #newstarterfurlough and variants. People who 
had recently started a new job “fell through the cracks” for financial support from the 
government. With 56,000 tweets to MPs using #newstarterfurlough and variants (com-
pared with only 21,000 using #stayhomesavelives and variants), #newstarterfurlough 
is the dominant hashtag campaign of the period. Given that those individuals are in an 
unfortunate position, it is all the more surprising to find that only 0.4% of those tweets 
contained abuse, as shown in Table 3. A possible explanation is that the “new starters” 
are a broader, and more polite, cross-section of society than people who usually reply to 
politicians on Twitter.
In contrast, tweets containing #stayhomesavelives and variants contained 6.0% 
abuse. Tweets containing hashtags refuting the very existence of the virus, for exam-
ple #scamdemic and #hoaxvirus, contained 7.8% abuse. Tweets describing COVID-19 
as “Chinese”, e.g., containing #chinesevirus, contained 5.4%. Tweets found containing 
anti-lockdown hashtags contained 4.9% abuse.
Table 3  Mention count of viewpoint-related hashtags, in all replies to MPs, Feb 7th to May 25th inclu-
sive
Some further variants of the terms given, including non-hashtag mentions in text, are also included but 
not listed here for brevity; see Gorrell et al. [33] for a more complete description
Search terms (in all replies to MPs, not case-sensitive) # tweets # abusive % abusive
“#endthelockdown” 5,506 272 4.940
“#newstarterfurlough” OR “#newstarterjustice” 55,593 243 0.437
“#stayhomesavelives” 20,538 1222 5.950
“#coronahoax” OR “#hoaxvirus” OR “#fakevirus” 415 61 14.699
“#coronabollocks” 250 19 7.600
“#plandemic” OR “#scamdemic” OR “#fakepandemic” 1178 64 5.433
“#filmyourhospital” OR “#emptyhospitals” 59 5 8.475
“#ccpvirus” OR “#chinaliedpeopledied” 2463 38 1.543
“#chinesevirus” 2208 119 5.389
“#NukeChina” OR “#DeathtoChina” OR “#DestroyChina” 31 2 6.452
“#GatesVirus” OR “#CIAVirus” OR “#AmericaVirus” 69 2 2.899
“#5gcoronavirus” 53 1 1.877
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Dimensions of political discourse during COVID‑19 (RQ2)
Our second research question asked what are the societal dimensions that appear to 
impact how media activities are perceived during the COVID-19 pandemic and how 
does this compare with those that impacted Brexit or recent general elections? For 
this question, we drew on previous work described in “Related work”, more specifi-
cally in “Politicians’ social media use in a health crisis” on levels of abuse toward 
UK MPs. We then examined the time period covered by our study in the context of 
three dimensions drawn from Andreouli et al. [1]: political authority, ideology, and 
affect. We use the four factors from Gorrell et al. [30] to help further describe these 
dimensions in terms of: prominence, event surges, engagement, and identity.
Political authority
As mentioned previously, Brexit created a notion of political authority that pre-
sented sovereignty of the UK on one side or community with Europe on the other 
[1]. During the past three UK elections, partisanship has led to a splintering of polit-
ical authority and an erosion of trust [31]. During the COVID-19 pandemic, we can 
see a similar effect, for example, the wearing of face-coverings as a personal versus 
social choice,16 and participation in protest versus public health.17
Increased name recognition and popularity have also been associated with higher 
levels of abuse in both the cases of Brexit and General Elections [30, 34, 51, 74]. 
Our COVID-19 data show similar trends.
Figure 3 shows number of replies to prominent politicians since early February, 
and shows that, for the most part, attention during COVID-19 has focused on Boris 
Johnson. He received a large peak in Twitter attention on March 27th. 58,286 replies 
were received in response to his tweet, announcing that he had COVID-19. Abuse 
was found in 2.3% of these replies. This is low for a prominent minister as we may 
discern from Fig.  1, indicating a generally supportive response to the prime min-
ister’s illness. Further peaks on Mr Johnson’s timeline correspond to the dates on 
which he was admitted to intensive care (April 6th), left hospital to recuperate at 
Chequers (April 12th), and began to ease the lockdown (May 10th). The late burst 
of attention on other politicians arises from several tweets by ministers in support of 
Dominic Cummings, the senior government advisor who chose to travel north to his 
parents’ home in the early stages of his illness with COVID-19.
However, one tweet receiving a high level of abuse regarded the very first video 
address made by Boris Johnson in response to the pandemic:
https ://twitt er.com/Boris Johns on/statu s/12383 65263 76404 1728 (9% of replies 
were abusive; tweet received 3% of all abuse to MPs in the period. It also includes a 
video statement.)
16 https ://www.south wales argus .co.uk/news/18444 799.weari ng-face-cover ing-mask-wales -not-compu 
lsory /.
17 https ://www.forbe s.com/sites /tarah aelle /2020/06/19/riski ng-their -lives -to-save-their -lives -why-publi 
c-healt h-exper ts-suppo rt-black -lives -matte r-prote sts/#11b5a c9685 1b.
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This country will get through this epidemic, just as it has got through many 
tougher experiences before.
For those who trust in Boris Johnson’s leadership and who like the way he com-
municates, this tweet may have provided some comfort. A review of replies to this 
tweet shows that supporters tweeted messages of appreciation and hope in response. 
For those who do not trust him and who believe that he should have acted sooner, 
this tweet was perceived as a provocation. Several replies are critical but not abusive 
point to official sources of information from elsewhere in Europe, or make advise-
ment to the public about staying home and avoiding non-essential journeys.
In this sense, COVID-19 lends its own political authority to some arguments. 
However, invoking COVID-19 as a member of the opposition, especially in the con-
text of persistent debates, is often met with accusations of “playing party politics”. 
The following tweet by David Lammy received 16% abusive replies, representing 
1% of all abuse sent to MPs in the March pre-lockdown period:
https ://twitt er.com/David Lammy /statu s/12398 35712 44439 1424
No more government time, energy or resources should be wasted on Brexit this 
year. Boris Johnson must ask for an extension to the transition period immedi-
ately. #COVID19 is a global emergency.
Several MPs made comments about the need to extend the Brexit transition period. 
All received a considerable amount of replies containing abusive language.
More generally, there is disagreement about the priorities of government during 
a crisis. For example, there was a considerable amount of abuse directed at Rich-
ard Burgon for a tweet in which he discussed the accomplishments of his work as 
shadow justice secretary.18 This was regarded by some critics as mistimed, given the 
PM’s health at the time, and received 17% abuse, constituting 2% of all abuse sent to 
MPs between April 1st and 16th inclusive.
In later sections, we will explore how the media activities of opposition parties 
are perceived by the public, in particular in connection with contentious subjects.
Events
Events are somewhat in a category of their own, as an MP’s past actions and words 
become part of the public’s priors in understanding the position of that MP. To con-
textualise the level of attention to MPs and the abusive replies they received in con-
nection with specific events, we review the events of the period, both in terms of 
who is receiving abusive replies and in the themes that are rising during the period 
as demonstrated by the appearance of certain hashtags.
18 https ://twitt er.com/Richa rdBur gon/statu s/12472 48198 93206 2208.
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Beginning of the pandemic
The hashtag cloud in Fig. 4 shows that Brexit remained the dominant topic in Twit-
ter political discourse during February, with the epidemic not yet having arrived in 
the UK.
Table 4 gives a baseline for attention on MPs as we go into the pandemic, show-
ing that aside from Boris Johnson, attention, and abuse, is high for Labour poli-
ticians. The column “Authored” refers to the number of tweets originally posted 
from that account that were not retweets or replies. “replyTo” refers to all of the 
replies received to the individual’s Twitter account in that period. The next column, 
“COV”, is the number of replies received to that account containing an explicit men-
tion of COVID-19, with the following column representing the number of replies 
that verbal abuse was found in (“Abusive”). The last three columns present the data 
in a comparative fashion. First, we have the percentage of replies that the individ-
ual received that was abusive. Next, we have the percentage of replies that were 
COVID-related. The last column is the percentage of COVID-related replies to that 
individual, in comparison with all COVID-related replies received by all MPs.
The word cloud in Fig. 5 shows all hashtags in tweets to MPs in earlier part of 
March, and unsurprisingly shows a complete topic shift, to the subject of the epi-
demic, to the virtual exclusion of all else.
We see from Table 5 that with the arrival of COVID-19 in the UK, Health secre-
tary Matt Hancock became more prominent on Twitter at this time, though attention 
was not more abusive. Attention on chancellor Rishi Sunak also increased and was 
not abusive. This is consistent with previous research that indicates a public willing-
ness and desire to trust authorities in a crisis [46, 67]. We see a high level of atten-
tion on Boris Johnson, but the abuse level is lower than was seen for him in previous 
Fig. 3  Number of replies received by relevant ministers and opposition leader Keir Starmer per week 
from February 7th to May 25th 2020 inclusive. Central peak relates to Boris Johnson’s illness with 
COVID-19; late uptick arises from Dominic Cummings’ controversial trip north
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years (we found 8.39% in the first half of 2019 as mentioned above; in 2017 as for-
eign secretary Mr. Johnson received similarly high abuse levels in high volumes). 
Negative attention on Labour politicians is high, but note that this was also the case 
before the start of the epidemic in the UK.
Matt Hancock received 11% abusive replies (3% of all abuse to MPs in the March 
pre-lockdown period) to the following tweet, in which he released his Telegraph 
article on the government’s response to the virus.
https ://twitt er.com/MattH ancoc k/statu s/12389 60146 34208 4609.
Fig. 4  Top 100 hashtags in all replies sent to MPs—February 7–29 2020 inclusive
Table 4  MPs with greatest number of replies from February 7 to February 29 2020 inclusive
Cell indicate party membership; bold for Conservative, italics for Labour
Name Authored ReplyTo COV Abusive % Ab % COV % Total COV
Boris Johnson 14 48,379 1,072 1695 3.504 2.216 37.773
David Lammy 89 47,368 73 2308 4.872 0.154 2.572
Richard Burgon 184 30,789 18 1556 5.054 0.058 0.634
Jeremy Corbyn 25 29,550 215 2400 8.122 0.728 7.576
Rebecca Long-Bailey 121 27,113 17 823 3.035 0.063 0.599
Zarah Sultana 96 18,630 12 677 3.634 0.064 0.423
Debbie Abrahams 96 18,186 45 822 4.520 0.247 1.586
Keir Starmer 97 15,455 26 360 2.329 0.168 0.916
Lisa Nandy 110 15,271 9 413 2.704 0.059 0.317
Priti Patel 9 13,664 45 345 2.525 0.329 1.586
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NEWS: My Telegraph article on the next stage of our #coronavirus plan: 
< link>
We must all do everything in our power to protect lives
Critics were angry that Mr. Hancock would post important government informa-
tion, during a time of extreme uncertainty, behind a pay wall. This goes back 
to the public’s information-seeking needs during a health crisis [46, 67]. Not 
only is information important for collective sense-making, it is also important 
for determining personal risk [70].
Fig. 5  Top 100 hashtags in all replies sent to MPs—March 1st–22nd 2020 inclusive
Table 5  MPs with greatest number of replies from March 1st to March 22nd 2020 inclusive
Cell indicates party membership; bold for conservative, italic for Labour
Name Authored replyTo COV Abusive % Ab % COV % Total COV
Boris Johnson 45 160,356 28,818 7684 4.792 17.971 49.380
David Lammy 120 43,386 1602 2952 6.804 3.692 2.745
Matthew Hancock 100 42,520 7167 1800 4.233 16.856 12.281
Jeremy Corbyn 44 42,435 1824 3244 7.645 4.298 3.125
Rishi Sunak 47 25,534 2225 284 1.112 8.714 3.813
Nadine Dorries 52 24,731 1275 466 1.884 5.155 2.185
Jess Phillips 154 20,931 394 541 2.585 1.882 0.675
Lisa Nandy 74 20,355 234 925 4.544 1.150 0.401
Richard Burgon 145 20,281 446 1222 6.025 2.199 0.764
Zarah Sultana 107 18,796 204 815 4.336 1.085 0.350
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Beginning of lockdown
With the commencement of lockdown, the rise of the hashtags “#stayhomesave-
lives” and #lockdownuknow shows a shift toward comment on the practical details. 
Support for the lockdown appears to be high at this stage, with the top ten hashtags 
featuring only pro-lockdown or generic COVID-19 tags. Attention continues to 
focus on Boris Johnson (see Gorrell et al. [33] for complete word clouds and tables 
as well as histograms for each period), and is even less abusive than previously, 
largely due to a surge in non-abusive attention in conjunction with his being diag-
nosed with COVID-19. By volume, the most abuse-generating tweet was Boris 
Johnson’s illness announcement, but as a percentage, this was remarkably un-abu-
sive, as discussed above, with only 2.3% abuse. The high abuse count follows only 
from the very high level of attention this tweet drew.
Moving into April 2020, the rise of the hashtag “#newstarterfurlough” shows 
that, prior to Donald Trump’s “liberation” tweets and the visible emergence of an 
anti-lockdown backlash, attention has already begun to focus on the economic cost 
of the lockdown, as illustrated by the prominence of hashtags such as #newstarter-
furlough and #wearethetaxpayers.
Boris Johnson’s abuse level continues to be low as his illness takes a serious 
turn. In the context of the pandemic, different influences from the public also have a 
measure of authority. For example, the high abuse level toward Jack Lopresti during 
this period relates to his controversial opinion that churches should open for Easter. 
Strong opinion in conjunction with a religious event is part of a pattern that we see 
in conjunction with Eid in the next section.
https ://twitt er.com/JackL opres ti/statu s/12475 08135 02941 1841 (18% abuse, 6% 
of all abuse sent to MPs between April 1st and 16th inclusive):
Open the churches for Easter – and give people hope https ://teleg raph.co.uk/
news/2020/04/06/open-churc hes-easte r-give-peopl e-hope/?WT.mc_id=tmg_
share _tw via @telegraphnews
https ://twitt er.com/JackL opres ti/statu s/12478 94726 48679 8342 (17% abuse, 3% of 
all abuse sent to MPs between April 1st and 16th inclusive):
Today I wrote to The Secretary of State @mhclg and also sent a copy of this 
letter to Secretary of State @DCMS to ask the Government to consider open-
ing church doors on Easter Sunday for private prayer.
Lockdown backlash
From mid-April 2020, a notable backlash against lockdown began to emerge. 
Hashtags now appear to be critical, often economically focused but also including 
accusations of lying against China, Boris Johnson and Conservatives, and references 
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to the shortage of personal protective equipment for medical workers. The distinct 
change in tone echoes events in the USA.19
In this context, it is interesting, therefore, that the tweet receiving the most abu-
sive response by volume (it also received a striking level of abuse by percentage) is 
this one by Ed Davey.
https ://twitt er.com/Edwar dJDav ey/statu s/12538 82262 71584 2560 (19% abuse, 5% 
of all abuse toward MPs for the period):
A pre-dawn meal today
Preparing for my first ever fast in the holy month of Ramadan
For Muslims doing Ramadan in isolation, you are not alone!
#RamadanMubarak
#LibDemIftar
The following tweet also attracted high levels of abuse by volume:
https ://twitt er.com/jerem ycorb yn/statu s/12533 41601 59985 2544 :
Ramadan Mubarak to all Muslims in Islington North, all across the UK and all 
over the world.
This tweet received 11% abusive replies, 2% of abuse for the period—this was also 
St George’s Day, so perceived as evidence of anti-English sentiment, as in the fol-
lowing paraphrased replies for example: “@jeremycorbyn So nothing about St 
George’s day then? Ah, that’s because we are English, the country you wanted to 
run but hate with a vengeance. And you wonder why you suffered such a huge defeat 
at the election” and “@jeremycorbyn So no mention of St. George’s day then? You 
utter cretin.”
These attempts to reach voters and how they are perceived by those not within the 
same ideological framework will be discussed in “Ideology”.
Lifting of restrictions
As lockdown begins to be eased in May 2020, we see a return to a high level of 
focus on Boris Johnson, with 194,000 replies compared to Matt Hancock’s 124,000 
as the next most replied to MP. Other senior conservatives are also prominent. High 
levels of abuse are received by ministers who defended Dominic Cummings’ actions 
on Twitter; Matthew Hancock (6.37%), Oliver Dowden (8.17%), and Michael Gove 
(7.13%). Boris Johnson also receives more abuse than he did in the previous period 
(4.92%). Example tweets are given below of ministers defending Mr. Cummings:20
https ://twitt er.com/MattH ancoc k/statu s/12641 62359 73355 5202 (7% abuse, 7% of 
abuse for the period):
20 More tweets by ministers defending Mr. Cummings:
 https ://twitt er.com/Olive rDowd en/statu s/12642 21876 37464 6786.
 https ://twitt er.com/micha elgov e/statu s/12641 26108 73318 6050.
19 e.g., https ://www.thegu ardia n.com/globa l/video /2020/apr/16/armed -prote sters -deman d-an-end-to-
michi gans-coron aviru s-lockd own-order s-video .
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I know how ill coronavirus makes you. It was entirely right for Dom Cum-
mings to find childcare for his toddler, when both he and his wife were getting 
ill.
https ://twitt er.com/MattH ancoc k/statu s/12649 75804 20894 7208 (9% abuse, 4% of 
abuse for the period):
Dom Cummings was right today to set out in full detail how he made his deci-
sions in very difficult circumstances. Now we must move on, fight this dread-
ful disease and get our country back on her feet
Hashtags show a high degree of negative attention focused on the partial treatment 
of Dominic Cummings, while continued attention on the economic plight of new 
starters is also in evidence. This signals the beginnings of contention that will blos-
som in the periods after this study was concluded.
Ideology
The ideologies that influenced Brexit, such as anti-prejudice and tolerance [1], are 
still apparent in the context of COVID-19. “Virtue signalling” is a common com-
plaint attached to nearly every tweet that addresses issues of inequality and some that 
are trying to engage voters (see “Findings: social media activities during COVID-19 
(RQ3)”). Virtue signalling is defined as behaviour that indicates support for causes 
or sentiments that carry moral value, such as donating to charity [73], without much 
actual effort or care for the topic behind it. Disagreement on what constitutes vir-
tue signalling versus actually caring about a social issue creates a “liminal hotspot” 
where misunderstanding takes place [1]. We go more deeply into the subject of vir-
tue signalling in “Social meedia activities: subjectivity in escalation and virtue”.
In many cases, identity and ideology are interrelated through experience. Indi-
viduals from minority backgrounds speak about racism more often, also in context 
of COVID-19, potentially because they experience it. When MPs from under-valued 
or under-represented minorities speak to their voters about racism, they are not only 
speaking to voters who need to understand experiences of racism, but also to voters 
who experience it directly. If the MP has a track record in working toward racial 
justice, their election is a signal that they should keep doing this work. Of the 15 
tweets shared by Women of Colour in our qualitative sample (190 Tweets receiving 
a high percentage and number of abusive replies), more than 50% are about engag-
ing voters and being proactive toward issues of inequality (we see this in more detail 
in Contentious issues: disrupting the mainstream discourse and in Table 6). Another 
40% are direct rebukes of authority from women in opposition parties. It seems that 
women of colour are disproportionately carrying the flame for the highly abused 
topic of inequality, as we see in Fig. 9. This may have partly to do with the party 
they belong to, but it appears to be also partly about the topics and expertise these 
women bring to the table. For example, Bell Ribeiro-Addy was elected for the first 
































Table 6  Controversial topics that are expressed MPs’ posts on Twitter, to which the MP received abusive replies
Descriptions and examples included
Controversial topic No. tweets Description Examples
People & Communication Style 47 Tweets about specific people and their actions or the way 
that they communicate
Dom Cummings followed the guidelines and looked after his 
family. End of story.- Oliver Dowden
Covid Response & Impact 67 Tweets about the COVID-19 pandemic and any responses 
or impacts
Latest NHS advice: If you have: a new continuous cough OR 
a high temperature You should stay at home for 7 days. 
Read the full guidance now: http://NHS.uk/coron aviru s - 
Boris Johnson
Inequality 45 Tweets about inequality in any form, be it racial, gender 
specific, religious, class-based, etc.
Amazing. Dave telling it like it is. - John McDonnell
Brexit 14 Tweets about Brexit Good to hear EU Commission saying they are fine with an 
Australia style deal or a bespoke Free Trade Agreement. So 
let’s get on with it. No need to argue over it all year. - John 
Redwood
Home rule & nationalism 17 Tweets that appear to address long-standing conflicts about 
the Union and its Governance, including pro-Scotland and 
anti-SNP sentiment
Really the most politically frustrating aspect of this crisis is 
not having an independent Scotland to do the emergency 
guaranteed income, to do the testing - to take a different 
path. We are instead shackled to inept economic extremists 
at Westminster. - Angus MacNeil
Grand total 190
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She addresses Sinophobia in communications about coronavirus and its origins in 
this tweet:
https ://twitt er.com/BellR ibeir oAddy /statu s/12475 70145 73375 8980
As senior Conservatives publish Sinophobic screeds in the rw press to distract 
from their own Government’s lethal complacency, it’s clear racism won’t stop 
for #Coronavirus. Neither must we opposing it. Join the fightback in an hour! 
http://ow.ly/4GBm3 0qw1j X
This quote communicates proactiveness, for example, with the words “oppose” or 
“fightback”. As such, this is the kind of statement that is not meant for those who do 
not accept racism as a fact of experience, or who do not think it is an important issue 
in the context of COVID-19. It is a call to action for those who do.
This tweet, from MP Rupa Huq, addresses the lack of women ministers present at 
press briefings:
https ://twitt er.com/RupaH uq/statu s/12461 07696 65232 0769
Once again headed up by a man for the umpteenth time - who we only heard a 
week ago had tested #COVID19 positive to boot. When will Downing Street 
allow a woman minister to front up one of these press shindigs?
Several responses to this tweet ask why the MP chooses to focus on gender, given 
that the roles most relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic just happen to be held 
by men. Or, they ask her to explain why she believes a woman could do a better job. 
Some responses also refer to this as “virtue signalling”, though the MP is a woman 
and her comment is about representation of women.
In terms of the General Elections in 2015 and 2017, topics of concern were pri-
marily around the economy, Europe, and the NHS. While Europe and Brexit are 
still present as important subjects, our topic analysis and the hashtags collected in 
each period show that the economy is now the greatest concern for users on Twitter, 
along with various implications for public health, survival of businesses, unemploy-
ment, and social welfare. The significant financial support that the government has 
provided during COVID-19 has revived discussions about socialism and capitalism 
more generally as economic models:
https ://twitt er.com/jerem ycorb yn/statu s/12388 97340 30979 0721
There’s no statutory sick pay for part-time, low-paid or zero-hours contract 
workers. And the rate of sick pay isn’t enough to live on. Wrong at any time 
- but dangerous while people who might be ill are asked to stay home. The sys-
tem is broken and now is the time to fix it.
This quote from Jeremy Corbyn attracted supportive messages, including some that 
are abusive toward Boris Johnson or other members of the Conservative party. How-
ever, there were also many criticisms of the tweet, which primarily express exasper-
ation with Mr. Corbyn or chastise him for bringing this subject up in the middle of a 
crisis. If one agrees with Mr. Corbyn and feels that this crisis has only further exem-
plified the failings of the social welfare system in the United Kingdom, his words 
will resonate. If not, they will most likely aggravate.
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Affect
Previous work has suggested that impassioned speech provides a measure of cred-
ibility on its own [1]. MPs have been asked to consider the tone of their messages to 
the public and to one another in Parliament [20]. However, in COVID-19, in which 
the country is embroiled in a large public health crisis, it is difficult to determine 
exactly how tone impacts the political discourse. When we were looking for esca-
lations in our qualitative sample, we looked at critiques of MPs’ tweets to try and 
understand what someone might object to in a given statement. Typically, hyper-
bolic language, sarcasm, insult, and making something personal are the escalations 
that are named. However, to avoid potentially classifying a tweet as escalating for 
using strong language around events that are urgent matters of public health, we 
required at least two measures of escalation to be present to classify a tweet as a 
potential escalation. When examining our sample, escalations were present in about 
a quarter of the tweets.
As a percentage of replies, a notable tweet was the following:
https ://twitt er.com/Henry Smith UK/statu s/12633 94101 00267 4176 (13% abuse, 
2% of abuse for the period of May):
Not that I should be surprised by the lazy left but interesting how work-shy 
socialist and nationalist MPs tried to keep the remote Parliament going beyond 
2 June.
In the context of an increasingly uncertain economic situation for many individu-
als, respondents felt that Mr. Smith was accusing those who have been furloughed 
or who are shielding of avoiding work. Several respondents also implied that work 
in communities to provide social support was not being valued. Though Mr. Smith’s 
comments (and his affect) may have been directed at his colleagues in Parliament, he 
hits a mark with left-leaning members of the British public, as well.
Many other tweets ( n = 60 ) are about rebuking authorities, which is sometimes 
done using strong language. We have 14 tweets from David Lammy in the sample, 
which is more than 7% of the sample. Many of these tweets include some sort of 
escalation indicator, such as hyperbole, sarcasm, or personal insults that critics tend 
to pick up on in their replies (see example in Table 2. Once again, this definition 
of “escalation” was defined by those who criticised the tweets. To understand this 
further, we extended our analysis to look more deeply at the specific subject mat-
ter being discussed. The subjects which Mr. Lammy is discussing are urgent and 
controversial in British political discourse, such as racism, Brexit, and more person-
ally, the leadership of Boris Johnson. It is not clear whether or not he is targeted 
because of his communication style, the topics he discusses, his party membership, 
or because of his ethnic background.
Affect and race are connected in how much anger and frustration those from a 
minority background are expected to express by a predominantly White society 
about issues that White people may find largely irrelevant [2]. The stereotypes of the 
“angry Black woman” (or man) persist, in particular with connection to the topic of 
racism or inequality more generally.
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Findings: social media activities during COVID‑19 (RQ3)
Our third research question asked: which social media activities of UK MPs during 
the COVID-19 pandemic receive the most abusive replies? To answer this question, 
we applied our coding scheme described in 4.3 to a sample of tweets that received a 
substantial number of replies that contained abusive language (see “Introduction”). 
The purpose of this was to identify qualitative differences in authors, content, or 
delivery that may help to explain the negative discourse related to their tweets and 
highlight any other social factors at play. In total, we identified 190 tweets meeting 
these criteria.
66 MPs authored the 190 tweets that received the highest number and percent-
ages of abusive replies. 17 MPs are women, which is approximately 35% of the 
sample. Women make up approximately 30% of UK Parliament.21 However, of the 
17 women, 41% are women of colour ( n = 7 ), though women of colour only make 
up a small percentage of an already small percentage MPs from a “minority” back-
ground.22 It is important to note that none of these women are members of the con-
servative party. In fact, Labour politicians have authored 108 of the 190 tweets in 
this sample. Conservatives authored 53, Liberal Democrats 16, the Scottish National 
Party 11, and the Democratic Unionists 2. To break this down further, we had 4 con-
servative MPs who are female (all white), and 25 male MPs. For the Labour Party, 
that split is more even, with 11 women and 14 men. Table 7 gives corpus statistics 
in terms of tweets authored. “Tweets” is number of tweets authored, “% of corp” 
is the percentage of the qualitative corpus that number constitutes, and “% Repr.” 
is the representation that demographic has among MPs with Twitter accounts for 
comparison. “# Replies” is the number of replies tweets by that demographic in the 
qualitative corpus received, and “# Abusive” is the number of those replies that were 
abusive (recall that the tweet is only included if it receives a high level of abuse).
Social media activities: subjectivity in escalation and virtue
Examining each tweet, we had 11 categories of social media activities, plus one 
additional “unclear” media category (see Table 2). We added a modifier to the media 
activity of “escalation”, if there were combinations of what we referred to as the five 
indicators of escalation: the presence of hyperbole (language that is perceived as 
having high valence), sarcasm or flippancy, insult, and abusive language, making 
something personal (criticising the individual rather than their actions) or solidify-
ing “us and them” narratives. These escalation indicators were derived from how 
critics and abusers of the tweets in our sample speak about escalating language and 
what they think is antagonistic. If a tweet only contained escalation indicators and 
no other content, it was categorised as “escalation” only. Examples of each category 
21 http://www.ukpol itica l.info/femal e-membe rs-of-parli ament .htm.
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are provided in Table 2 and the full qualitative sample and coding notes are provided 
at the URL given in “Availability of data and material”.
Escalations were particularly subjective and, therefore, difficult to classify. How-
ever, only 22 tweets contained some measure of escalation and 9 were coded as 
“Escalation” only. Here is an example of a tweet from Labour Party member Ian 
Lavery that contains an escalation, in addition to its main media activity of rebuking 
authorities:
https ://twitt er.com/IanLa veryM P/statu s/12385 69895 61862 5536
So does this “herd immunity” @BorisJohnson strategy mean accepting the 
end of life for many elderly & vulnerable people But others should be fine ? 
Just asking for the elderly lady across the street.
This tweet was categorised as an escalation, because it contains both sarcasm and 
hyperbole.
Some tweets received criticisms and abuse related to a particular event or pattern 
of behaviour. We have 12 examples of this in our sample. Examples of this include 
Dominic Cummings’ behaviour during lockdown in May (see “Events”), the birth 
of Boris Johnson’s child, or Sammy Wilson’s previous voting record on the NHS 
(when combined with a tweet promoting clapping for the NHS).
Figure  6 shows the media activity category and the number of abusive replies 
per category. While tweets with escalations may attract the higher percentages of 
abusive replies, the most common activities getting abusive replies are those ordi-
nary to the job of an MP. The most common media activities receiving replies that 
contain abusive language are Direct Rebuke of Authorities ( n = 60 ) and Engaging 
Voters ( n = 47 ). The following quote from Lisa Nandy (coded as a Direct Rebuke of 
Authorities) received 9% replies including abusive language:
https ://twitt er.com/lisan andy/statu s/12373 39808 01754 7264
It is irresponsible and short-sighted from the government to rule out extending 
the post-Brexit transition period. We should be taking action now to provide 
certainty for business in the face of this global economic challenge.
Table 7  Proportion of the qualitative corpus (most abused tweets) authored by different demographics, 
alongside representation of that demographic among MPs on Twitter for comparison, the number of 
replies, and the number of abusive replies received by those tweets
Demographic Tweets % of corp % Repr. # Replies # Abusive
White men 348 72.63 60.63 257,960 28,263
Men of colour 25 10.53 4.36 28,727 2938
Women of colour 32 7.89 5.57 30,999 3198
White women 169 8.95 29.44 33,435 3391
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This is a fairly standard argument from a member of the opposition party who was 
a “Remain” voter, preferring a “soft Brexit”.23 Likewise, the following tweet from 
conservative Jack Lopresti is an attempt to speak to a core group voters and cham-
pion their interests:
https ://twitt er.com/JackL opres ti/statu s/12483 06181 52276 3778
If off-licences and takeawayys are open, churches should be, Tory MP claims 
https ://t.co/aA2CY 06XrU 
This tweet was sign-posting to an article in the Telegraph in which Mr. Lopresti 
makes his views known. This tweet attracted nearly 12% abusive replies.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, all of the parties receive replies that contain abusive lan-
guage when they do the parts of their job that aggravate the other parties. For exam-
ple, the parties in opposition criticise the party in power, which will defend itself. 
All parties attempt to reach voters. However, the left and left-centrist parties tend to 
reach out to voters that conservatives do not, such as religious minorities, migrants, 
and People of Colour. The subject of “virtue signalling” arises in criticisms of this 
type of social media activity. This is evident in the large amount of abusive replies 
received by Liberal Democrats in response to their participation in Ramadan (see 
“Events”).
As mentioned previously, virtue signalling is defined as communicating support 
for a specific issue with high moral value (such as fighting racism) without provid-
ing tangible support and effort [73]. When the accusation of virtue signalling is 
levelled, the implicit assumption is that the gesture is empty or amounts to “moral 
grandstanding” [64] without substance behind it. In this case, in the past 10 years, 
Fig. 6  Media activities and replies containing abusive language
23 https ://www.theyw orkfo ryou.com/mp/24831 /lisa_nandy /wigan /votes .
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evidence shows that the Muslim community has shifted support from the Labour 
Party to the Liberal Democrats.24 The party has responded to this, attempting repeat-
edly to elect a Muslim MP. The party has shown some attention to the social chal-
lenges of this group, suspending a candidate in 2019 for his comments online doubt-
ing the existence of Islamaphobia.25 They have also had a few gaffes, showing a lack 
of awareness of the culture,26 and have still not had a Muslim MP, despite efforts.27 
Still, there is also evidence that the gesture of fasting and donating to charity as part 
of Ramadan was perceived as showing solidarity with the Muslim community dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic.28 Virtue signalling needs to be considered within a 
framework of whose attention is being courted and whether or not that community 
views the attention as tokenistic or meaningful.
COVID‑19 topics: priorities and leadership
Our second round of coding dealt with the COVID-19 subject referenced or alluded 
to in the tweet, which we determined inductively by going through the set of tweets 
using thematic analysis. We assigned tweets to one of eight categories, including 
one “non-COVID” category ( n = 37 ), if the topic was not related to COVID-19. 
These non-COVID topics include the floods that happened just prior to the pan-
demic, some more general thoughts on platform issues that are continuously rele-
vant, such as budget and migration. Many non-COVID- related tweets were posted 
before COVID-19 had reached the UK to such a significant extent. Topics include 
the cabinet reshuffle, class issues, Brexit, and migration.
After COVID-19 began to take hold, those non-COVID topics shift and are pri-
marily related to specific issues or events, such as Jeremy Corbyn stepping down 
and Keir Starmer taking lead of the Labour Party, renewed references to a One UK 
policy/One Parliament, Boris Johnson and the birth of his child, and the Liberal 
Democrats celebration of Ramadan. Within the COVID-19 topics, some more spe-
cific categories, such as “fatalities” or the NHS, were absorbed under the main cat-
egory of Health challenges and deaths to arrive at groupings that including roughly 
the same number of examples from our data sample. The full list of categories can 
be found at the URL provided in “Availability of data and material”. In Fig. 7, how-
ever, we show which topics around COVID-19 were associated with receiving more 
replies that are abusive in our qualitative sample (Table 8). 
Leadership and communication ( n = 39 ), along with Lockdown and Social Dis-
tancing issues ( n = 28 ) were the COVID-19 topics that had the best representation 
in the sample, with high number of replies that contain abusive language. These two 
24 https ://www.aljaz eera.com/focus /briti shele ction /2010/05/20105 31243 64855 79.html.
25 https ://metro .co.uk/2019/04/18/lib-dem-candi date-suspe nded-comme nts-musli ms-92434 30/.
26 https ://www.teleg raph.co.uk/polit ics/2020/04/26/lib-dem-counc illor -apolo gises -tweet ing-photo -bacon 
-solid arity /.
27 http://musli mnews .co.uk/newsp aper/top-stori es/recor d-18-musli m-mps-elect ed-major ity-women /.
28 https ://www.easte rneye .biz/lib-dem-mps-to-fast-durin g-ramad an-to-show-unity -for-musli m-commu 
nity/.
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categories include issues such as perceived government inaction and tone (Leader-
ship and Communication), and guidance or impacts around lockdown or social dis-
tancing, such as wearing a face mask (Lockdown and Social Distancing).
The following tweet from Labour MP Yvette Cooper attracted more than 8% 
abusive replies, addressing perceived confusion around guidance from the UK 
government:
https ://twitt er.com/Yvett eCoop erMP/statu s/12418 49797 15539 3537.
I watched the Prime Minister’s press conference in despair. In a public health 
emergency communication and information saves lives. Yet time & again the 
Government keeps failing to push out a strong clear message to everyone. For 
all our sakes they urgently need to get a grip.
The following tweet from Jacob Rees-Mogg linked to an article about the Queen iso-
lating herself amidst COVID-19 concerns. It attracted 11% abusive replies, mostly 
for invoking the name of the Queen or comparing her experience to those of citizens 
who are struggling to meet their needs.
https ://twitt er.com/Jacob _Rees_Mogg/statu s/12399 49070 42641 9200.
As always an example to the nation: God save the Queen
https ://t.co/N7egX eDzXD ?amp=1
Discussion of Health Challenges and Deaths ( n = 27 ) received the greatest percent-
age of abusive replies. This includes conversations around UK fatalities in compar-
ison to other nations, support for the NHS, and issues with testing. This type of 
comparison, as mentioned previously (especially from someone in a left-orientated 
party), is generally received as negative, and even unpatriotic in some critiques.
Women of colour tended to discuss topics that address the needs of minorities 
and under-valued groups during COVID-19. White women have a profile more 
similar to men, in which questioning leadership and communication tended to be 
the COVID-19 subject for which they received more replies containing abusive 
language. Clearly, questioning the government in power may lead to criticism. 
Our literature review indicated that people tend to want to trust authorities during 
a crisis, though, perhaps, this will shift as the pandemic progresses. Labour politi-
cians’ desire to keep the subject of racism and discrimination during COVID-19 at 
the forefront attracts some abusive comments for what is called “playing politics”, 
delivering “low blows” or “playing the race card” to the party in power. Naturally, 
the opposition parties believe that it is their job to rebuke authorities and suggest 
alternative policies. Likewise, racism is not seen as a platform issue, but a social 
issue that is continuously relevant. In this sense, what is relevant to COVID-19 and 
should be prioritised is being negotiated in some of this dialogue.
Contentious issues: disrupting the mainstream discourse
When we looked deeper at the controversy that might be latent in the topics above, 
we identified more than 50 distinct subjects from our open coding, and had one 
category of “unclear”. Some categories were related, such as Islam and Muslims, 
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Racism, and Immigration. We reduced the categories to five predominant issues (see 
Fig. 8): Home Rule/Nationalist perspectives, Inequality and perceptions of inequal-
ity, Brexit (a continued issue with new relevance), COVID-19 Response and Impact, 
and finally, People and Communication (which includes subjects like personal folly, 
tone, etc.). Proportions of each subject to appear in tweets from different demo-
graphic groups, as well as overall, are shown in Fig. 9.
For example, the #stayalert slogan of the conservative government received con-
siderable criticism for being confusing and potentially working against the goal of 
encouraging citizens to simply stay home. Criticising the government’s efforts, MP 
Ian Blackford tweeted:
https ://twitt er.com/Ianbl ackfo rd_MP/statu s/12592 50871 81429 5552.
“#stayalert. What kind of buffoon thinks of this kind of nonsense. It is an 
invisible threat. Staying alert is not the answer #StayHomeSaveLives is.”
This tweet received both a number of abusive replies to Mr. Blackford for critis-
ing the government’s attempts to resolve complex challenges during the pandemic, 
and a number of supportive replies (some of which are also abusive toward the gov-
ernment and certain ministers). This polarisation indicates a liminal hotspot around 
trusting and critiquing authorities in crisis.
In terms of party insights, the Liberal Democrats received a considerable amount 
of attention for speaking about Ramadan and the Muslim community (56% of their 
sample). The SNP, as one might expect, gathers some abusive replies when tweet-
ing support for Scottish independence or for promoting Scottish excellence. Hannah 
Bardell received abusive and critical replies for posting the following tweet:
https ://twitt er.com/Hanna hB4Li viMP/statu s/12387 50253 18205 0310.
Once again the PM following Nicola Sturgeon’s lead
































Table 8  COVID-19 topics that are expressed MPs’ posts on Twitter, to which the MP received abusive replies
COVID-19 topic No. tweets Description Examples
Covid & Brexit 10 Discussing the impact of COVID-19 on Brexit The country cannot afford the economic damage and chaos 
of a no-deal Brexit at the end of this year. Time is run-
ning out for the Government to agree to an extension and 
people’s livelihoods first.- Layla Moran
Health challenges & deaths (e) 27 Discussion of and reporting about fatalities during 
COVID-19
Italy: Population - 60 m Coronavirus cases - 21,157 Deaths 
- 1,441 UK: Population - 66 m Coronavirus cases - 1,372 
Deaths - 35 Italy had their first confirmed case 24hrs 
before the UK. The strategy is working. - Rob Roberts
Finance % benefits 23 Discussion of how financial support and benefits will work 
during COVID-19. This includes discussion of what 
COVID-19 has shown us about our current economic 
models
There is no statutory sick pay for part-time, low-paid or 
zero-hours contract workers. And the rate of sick pay is 
not enough to live on. Wrong at any time - but dangerous 
while people who might be ill are asked to stay home. The 
system is broken and now is the time to fix it. - Jeremy 
Corbyn
Opposition responses 9 Defense or rebuke of Labour MPs specifically Intentionally misleading reporting is really disappointing 
at a time like this. I’ve spoken about the opportunity for 
people to get out there and help their local communities 
and those in need. Nonsense to suggest otherwise. We all 
need to do our bit to get through this crisis. - Ian Lavery
Leadership & communication 36 Discussion of how policy or commentary has been deliv-
ered during the COVID-19 crisis
The @theSNP continue to let down thousands of homes 
in rural and remote communities. We need an audit on 
how they’re spending broadband rollout money! See my 
exchange with the Government - Jamie Stone
Lockdown & social distancing 28 Discussion of how lockdown or social distancing is 
impacting people, the economy and the virus
I’m all in favour of wearing the appropriate face mask! @
YesBikers - Stewart Hosie
Minorities & Under-valued Groups 17 Any discussion about a group that is viewed as a minority 
group in the UK
As senior Conservatives publish Sinophobic screeds in the 
rw press to distract from their own Government’s lethal 
complacency, it’s clear racism won’t stop for #Coronavi-
rus. Neither must we opposing it. Join the fightback in an 
































Table 8  (continued)
COVID-19 topic No. tweets Description Examples
Non-COVID 40 Any discussion about topics that are not linked to Covid-
19 in direct ways, such as flooding
A pre-dawn meal today Preparing for my first ever fast in 
the holy month of Ramadan For Muslims doing Ramadan 
in isolation, you are not alone! #RamadanMubarak #Lib-
DemIftar - Ed Davey
Grand total 190
Descriptions and examples included
436 Journal of Computational Social Science (2020) 3:401–443
1 3
The tweet was accompanied by an article from the Guardian29 about the Prime Min-
ister’s decision to ban mass gatherings.
Angus MacNeil was called “divisive” and “divisionist” for the following tweet in 
response to clapping for the NHS:
It is “NHS Scotland”
Fig. 8  Contentious issues and replies containing abusive language
Fig. 9  The 190 highly abused tweets in the qualitative sample, split by topic and by demographic. “WW” 
means white women, “WoC” means women of colour, and similarly for men
29 https ://twitt er.com/guard ianne ws/statu s/12385 91827 44965 1205/photo /1.
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Likewise, making statements in favour of uniting the four UK countries, or mak-
ing light of those countries’ prerogative to handle the pandemic differently, attracts 
strong criticism and abuse. For example, Stephen Crabb received several abusive 
replies for the following tweet:
Quite the change in rhetoric from the days when Welsh Government were 
encouraging people to come to Wales and drive their 4x4’s right onto the 
beaches.
Another liminal hotspot is around who is expected to speak about social issues of 
injustice, which commonly attract abusive responses. Women of colour were speak-
ing mostly about inequality when they received replies containing abuse (10 Tweets, 
which is 66% of our sample of women of colour, and 5% of our total sample). Men 
of colour more closely resembled the subject attention of both White women and 
White men on the more general discussion of COVID-19 response and leadership 
through the crisis (For all men, issues with Leadership, or COVID-19 response 
made up 60% of all topics; for white women, more than 70%. 10% of the topics 
discussed by men in their sample are about controversial people specifically, such as 
Boris Johnson, Jeremy Corbyn, and Dominic Cummings).
Discussion and future work
All activity online can be viewed as communication and persuasion—there are peo-
ple on different sides of different issues, vying for the public attention. This can 
attract positive and negative responses. While our small qualitative sample may 
not generalise across all categories, overall, what our investigation indicates is that 
dimensions of political discourse are mediated by perceptions of power, potentially 
due to the uncertain situation created by COVID-19, and audience. In the follow-
ing sections, we summarise our findings about the influence of ideology, political 
authority, and affect on how the words of MPs are communicated and interpreted by 
the public during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Power, ideology, and virtue
Ideology and virtue are connected in our qualitative data to what kind of power the 
individual or party has (or is perceived to have). When parties on the political left 
speak directly with and from under-valued communities, this may be perceived as 
virtue signalling by the political right. Likewise, when conservatives show a lack 
of tact toward excluded communities, especially from a position of power, this is 
judged more harshly by the ideological left.
Similarly, when the party in power communicated policy about controversial 
issues in the name of the people, it received push-back from people who did not vote 
for that party. When the left attempted to meet voters by discussing issues (racism, 
migration), a portion of the public was defensive (and sometimes offensive). Look-
ing at successful interventions by opposition parties in the government’s activities, 
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for example, may constitute an interesting area for future exploration. More specifi-
cally, this research could help to answer questions about the origins of priorities and 
disagreements in partisan politics.
Power, authority, and vindication
What the answers to our three research questions indicate is that it matters who 
is “in charge”, when looking at how the public and other ministers respond to the 
social media activities of UK MPs during COVID-19. The party in power (along 
with its members) will have more responsibility to the public for mastering tone and 
explaining their actions. Opposition parties will have more difficulty in a health cri-
sis to not be perceived as unnecessarily antagonistic. In addition, we found that it 
matters who a person is and what they represent, whether or not an individual will 
be perceived as a trustworthy authority. Many tweets in our sample appeared to be 
speaking to core groups of voters and other parliamentarians. They are not necessar-
ily an invitation for debate.
Power, affect, and vitriol
In terms of affect, our data show that it matters what you say and how you say it, 
particularly in connection with priors. If Jeremy Corbyn posts about racism, and has 
been continuously in the news for not handling antisemitism in his party, he will get 
some angry replies. If Sammy Wilson voted against a pay-rise for nurses in 2017, 
and then posts a “clap for carers” post on Twitter, those who remember his prior 
voting record will be angry. The more affected a tweet is, the more this appears to 
aggravate.
Vitriol as a result of one’s previous political statements or actions is one side 
of the story. Hate is another. The issue of what is abusive versus what is hate 
speech needs to be disentangled from both abuse and from racism. Racism does not 
only involve hate speech. It also involves (a) expecting people of colour to cham-
pion racial equality, as the breakdown of topics indicates and (b) framing racism 
as a fringe issue. This is evidenced in our dataset. Abuse, though uncomfortable 
and uncivil, is a different type of speech whose study may be useful for any num-
ber of discussions, potentially on the subject of agonism or counter-speech. Ago-
nism argues that the contestations of the time can be used to renew democracy and 
strengthen public discourse [47]. Promising work on recognising an highlighting 
counter-speech in online communication is already on the horizon [15, 50].
Conclusion
In this paper, we explored how UK MPs contribute to the information and commu-
nication environment during COVID-19, and the abusive replies that they receive. 
Contextualising these activities in terms of what the public expect during a health 
439
1 3
Journal of Computational Social Science (2020) 3:401–443 
crisis, how ministers typically use social media to communicate in crisis, and which 
mitigating features of either the person or context interfere in those activities, we 
were able to advance the conversation about online abuse toward some new direc-
tions, such as how to understand virtue signalling or what it means to play party 
politics. Building on previous studies of abusive language toward British MPs, we 
offered a large-scale, mixed-methods study of abusive and antagonistic responses 
to UK politicians during the COVID-19 pandemic from early February to late May 
2020. We found that—similarly to other key moments in British contemporary poli-
tics—political ideology, authority, and affect have played a role in how MPs social 
media posts were received by the public. In the context of COVID-19, we found 
that pressing subjects, like financial support or unemployment, may attract high lev-
els of engagement, but do not necessarily lead to abusive dialogue. As with earlier 
findings, prominence and event surges impact the amount of abusive replies MPs 
received. In addition, the topic of the tweet (in particular if it is divisive) and the 
individual bringing that topic into discussion (their gender, ethnicity or party, for 
example) impacted levels of abuse. Women of colour appear to bring the topic of 
inequality to the table and this attracts a variety of abuse. Other MPs may be dis-
cussing inequality and not receiving abuse (which this work did not cover).
In conclusion, this work contributes to the wider understanding of abusive lan-
guage online, in particular that which is directed at public officials. Issues of power, 
which are crystallised in terms of political power or social power, impact communi-
cation at all stages.
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